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I. INTRODUCTION 
Public1 restrooms2 are the historical site for many civil rights struggles. 
“Whites only” signs are a reminder of the commonplace racial segregation 
found in the southern United States prior to 1964.3 In the southwest United 
States, restroom signs in the 1950s often read “Mexicans and Dogs not 
allowed.”4 Not only did racially-segregated restrooms send a message of 
inferiority to racial minorities,5 they also limited their ability to travel across 
                                                                                                                     
 1 The term “public” refers to any restroom outside the home; it could be a restroom 
maintained by a public entity, such as a city, as well as a restroom maintained by a private 
entity, such as a restaurant or hotel. As discussed in Part II, infra, the original “public” 
restrooms were those financed by local government in public spaces. Over time, the word 
has come to encompass restrooms found in private, commercial establishments. 
 2 The term “rest room” or “restroom” developed in the early twentieth century to 
describe public washrooms in small towns “which aimed to serve farm families in town for 
a day of shopping. Located in business blocks or homes near the business district, the 
small-town ‘rest rooms’ were like domestic spaces with small toilet rooms and larger 
parlors, dining rooms and kitchens.” Peter C. Baldwin, Public Privacy: Restrooms in 
American Cities, 1869–1932, 48 J. SOC. HIST. 264, 274 (2014). Other terms that are 
sometimes used to convey similar meaning are bathroom, toilet facility, and potty. ERA 
opponents coined the term “unisex bathrooms” to describe sex-integrated bathrooms. See 
infra Part II.B. 
 3 C.J. Griffin, Workplace Restroom Policies in Light of New Jersey’s Gender Identity 
Protection, Note, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 409, 423–24 (2009) (documenting race-segregated 
facilities under Jim Crow); see also Baldwin, supra note 2, at 277 (“Southern cities did 
segregate the races. Dallas, for instance, built an underground restroom in 1915 with 
separate sections for whites and blacks. Atlanta opened one in 1921 with a room for white 
women on the second floor, white men on the first floor, and blacks in the basement.”). In 
1964, Congress banned such racial segregation through the enactment of Title II of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201(a), 78 Stat. 241, 243 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012)). 
 4 Lilian Jiménez, America’s Legacy of Xenophobia: The Curious Origins of Arizona 
Senate Bill 1070, 48 CAL. W. L. REV. 279, 289 (2012) (“Mexicanos were segregated in 
schools, railroads, hotels restaurants, public bathrooms, and other public accommodations. 
Signs in public places commonly read ‘Mexicans and Dogs not allowed.’ Historians have 
documented how a large number of Mexicanos were robbed of their land and subjected to a 
dual wage system, segregation, and lynching.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Karla Mari 
McKanders, Identification of Race in the Law: Sustaining Tiered Personhood: Jim Crow 
and Anti-Immigrant Laws, 26 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 163, 182 (2010))). 
 5 For a graphic description of racially segregated bathrooms and drinking fountains, 
see Elizabeth Abel, Bathroom Doors and Drinking Fountains: Jim Crow’s Racial 
Symbolic, 25 CRITICAL INQUIRY 435, 452 (1999). 
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the United States, including many areas in the North,6 because the “whites 
only” restroom would often be the only convenient restroom.7  
The disability rights community has also fought for restroom access. 
When Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990,8 
restroom accessibility was given a very high priority9 because it is impractical 
to travel outside the home if one does not have access to restrooms. 
Inaccessible restrooms were the “[a]ble-bodied only” sign for the disability 
community.10 As with whites-only restrooms, the inaccessible restroom might 
be the only convenient restroom.11  
A less-recognized accessibility problem when the ADA was enacted in 
1990 was the inaccessibility of restrooms for those individuals who used 
opposite-sex12 companions to assist with toileting. Even if a restroom met 
ADA accessibility guidelines, it might be unavailable for a person with a 
disability, who used assistance, if that restroom were limited to people of one 
                                                                                                                     
 6 Paul Finkelman, The Radicalism of Brown, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 35, 41 (2004) 
(“Blacks reported that despite laws which prohibited discrimination it was ‘difficult to find 
a meal or a hotel room in the downtown areas of most northern cities.’ Enforcement of 
such laws was lax and businesses ‘discouraged [blacks] from patronizing places by letting 
them wait indefinitely for service, charging them higher prices, giving poor service, and 
publicly embarrassing them in various ways.’ Although illegal, ‘whites only’ signs could 
be found in some places in the North. But, generally such signs were unnecessary, as some 
businesses simply refused to accommodate or serve blacks.” (alteration in original) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE 
RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS 78 (1947))). 
 7 Jennifer Levi & Daniel Redman, The Cross-Dressing Case for Bathroom Equality, 
34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133, 139 (2010) (“[Often] in the workplace, blacks had to travel 
great distances to use the restroom, while white restrooms were generally just off the shop 
floor.” (alteration in original) (quoting Griffin, supra note 3, at 424)). 
 8 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 
327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 9 Id. § 227 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12147(a)). 
 10 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the Comm. on 
Labor & Human Res. & the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong. 78 (1989) 
(statement of Neil Hartigan, Att’y Gen. of Illinois) (“All of us can surely agree that the 
time is long since past when it was legal or morally acceptable for public facilities to have 
signs saying, ‘Whites only’. But a restaurant or a theater with steps for an entrance, or an 
office building with a third floor bathroom and no elevator in effect has a sign saying 
‘Able-bodied only’.”). 
 11 See, e.g., Berthiaume v. Doremus, 998 F. Supp. 2d 465, 474 (W.D. Va. 2014) 
(holding in favor of a restaurant patron who used a walker and sued a restaurant for lack of 
an accessible entrance and restroom). 
 12 This Article uses the terms “sex” and “gender” interchangeably, typically relying 
on the way the term is used by those making a particular argument. By using the term 
“opposite-sex,” I do not mean to endorse the concept that the sexes are “opposites,” but this 
is how this issue has historically been considered as part of the disability rights discourse. 
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sex.13 Public accommodations sometimes have addressed this problem by 
offering family-style restrooms that are not limited to people of a single sex.14  
Nonetheless, the creation of family-style restrooms as a solution to the 
opposite-sex companion problem for the disability community segregates 
individuals with disabilities from others; the disability rights community 
typically opposes segregation.15 The exclusion of people with disabilities from 
some public, inaccessible restrooms may heighten nondisabled people’s sense 
of people with disabilities as “other” while also limiting social access between 
people who are disabled and nondisabled people.  
The disability rights community also supports the right of a person with a 
disability to bring an opposite-sex companion into a single-sex restroom;16 
covered entities must comply with this request under the ADA.17 Because the 
disability rights community supports this right, it has opposed North 
Carolina’s House Bill 2,18 which limits that kind of assistance.19 By contrast, 
California has a rule requiring safety roadside rest areas to permit a person 
with a disability to be accompanied in a communal, sex-segregated restroom 
                                                                                                                     
 13 For a testimonial of that problem, see Shelley Peterman Schwarz, In Search of a 
Unisex Restroom, INSIDE MS, Jan.–Mar. 2003, at 67, 67–68, describing how she was able 
to sit on the toilet but was unable to get back up because her male assistant could not be in 
the female restroom. 
 14 See Kathryn H. Anthony & Meghan Dufresne, Potty Parity in Perspective: Gender 
and Family Issues in Planning and Designing Public Restrooms, 21 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 
267, 283 (2007) (discussing the availability of family-style restrooms); Unisex & Family 
Restrooms, AM. RESTROOM ASS’N, http://www.americanrestroom.org/family/ [https://perm 
a.cc/55PF-C9M6] (describing advantages of a family-style restroom for people with 
disabilities). 
 15 See generally Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (holding that 
the ADA contains an integration principle). “The preamble to the Attorney General’s Title 
II regulations defines ‘the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified 
individuals with disabilities’ to mean ‘a setting that enables individuals with disabilities to 
interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible.’” Id. at 592 (quoting 28 
C.F.R. pt. 35 app. A, at 450 (1998)). 
 16 DISABILITY RIGHTS N.C., HB 2 HARMS NORTH CAROLINIANS WITH DISABILITIES 
(Apr. 2016), http://www.disabilityrightsnc.org/sites/default/files/HB2%20response%20DR 
NC.pdf [https://perma.cc/3V2S-BT8K]. 
 17 See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ADA BEST PRACTICES TOOK KIT 
FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ch. 1, at 8–9 (Dec. 2006), https://www.ada.gov/pcat 
oolkit/chap1toolkit.pdf [https://perma.cc/ND48-C74Q] (providing this as an example of a 
reasonable modification under 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)). 
 18 Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, H.B. 2, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 2d Extra 
Sess. (N.C. 2016). 
 19 See, e.g., DISABILITY RIGHTS N.C., supra note 16 (“There is no exception that 
allows a person with a disability to enter a restroom in a public agency that is assigned to 
the sex of his or her caregiver. Example: A twelve year old boy with a disability who needs 
assistance to use the restroom and whose caregiver is his mother will need to use the men’s 
room at the NC Museum of Natural Sciences, though his mother may enter to provide him 
assistance.”).  
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by a person of the opposite sex, and for specific signage to indicate that 
option.20 
The specter of “unisex bathrooms” helped derail the ratification of the 
federal Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in the 1970s and 1980s.21 ERA 
opponents invoked the symbol of unisex bathrooms to attack sex-integrated 
bathrooms on the basis that such bathrooms would make society unisex by 
leading to the end of gender differentiation.22 By contrast, feminists have 
recently sought “potty parity” laws, which redesign restrooms so that women 
wait no longer than men to use a toilet, nor walk further than men to access 
restrooms in public spaces.23 These “potty parity” laws do not challenge the 
sex segregation itself. 
The debate regarding restroom access has also occurred in the transgender 
context—whether the Obama Administration had the regulatory authority 
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 197224 to issue guidance that 
required educational entities to allow students and faculty to use the 
communal, sex-designated restroom with which they self-identify and not limit 
transgender members of the community to restrooms with single stalls.25 
                                                                                                                     
 20 See CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 223.5 (West 2005). By allowing only people with 
disabilities to sex-integrate restrooms, one might argue that these kinds of exceptions “de-
sex” individuals with disabilities. The disability rights community has had to argue 
historically that it, too, should be considered to be “sexual.” See, e.g., William Burr, 
Sexuality of the Disabled Often Overlooked, 183 CMAJ NEWS E259 (Mar. 22, 2011). 
 21 See Levi & Redman, supra note 7, at 139–40; see also Paul A. Freund, The Equal 
Rights Amendment Is Not the Way, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 234, 240 (1971) (“One of 
the prime targets of the equal-rights movement has been the color-segregated public rest 
room. Whether segregation by sex would meet the same condemnation is at least a fair 
question to test the legal assimilation of racism and ‘sexism.’”). Although Phyllis Schlafly 
is often given credit for promoting the specter of “unisex bathrooms,” I have not been able 
to find any primary evidence in support of that statement or her use of that specific term. 
See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, New Drive Afoot to Pass Equal Rights Amendment, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 28, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/27/AR2 
007032702357.html [https://perma.cc/D4LZ-MCJE] (claiming that Schlafly raised fear of 
unisex restrooms, but offering no support for that statement). Instead, I have found one of 
her newsletters where she mentions that Professor Freund “demolishes the argument that 
we could maintain separate rest rooms on the principle of the ‘right of privacy.’” Phyllis 
Schlafly, The Right to be a Woman, PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY REP., Nov. 1972. 
 22 See infra Part II.B.  
 23 See Anthony & Dufresne, supra note 14, at 278–80. 
 24 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1686 (2012). 
 25 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER ON 
TRANSGENDER STUDENTS 4 (May 2016). This Article is being written following the 
inauguration of Donald Trump as President of the United States. The Department of 
Education and Department of Justice in the new Administration has revoked that guidance. 
See Sandhya Somashekhar et al., Trump Administration Rolls Back Protections for 
Transgender Students, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/loca 
l/education/trump-administration-rolls-back-protections-for-transgender-students/2017/02/ 
22/550a83b4-f913-11e6-bf01-d47f8cf9b643_story.html?utm_term=.64dce951ab3d [https:/ 
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While that debate is important, the authority of the Obama Administration to 
issue that guidance is not the subject of this Article.  
This Article raises a different question: is it constitutional for public 
entities to continue to require sex-segregated restrooms?26 Transgender 
individuals are not necessarily the most appropriate people to challenge the 
sex segregation of restrooms, because they sometimes have an interest in 
proclaiming their gender self-identification in a sex-segregated restroom as 
part of their transition process.27 They may want to use sex-segregated 
restrooms as an expression of their gender identity.28 People who object to 
being required to choose a sex-segregated restroom may be more appropriate 
plaintiffs to challenge the sex segregation of restrooms. 
Sex-segregated restrooms constitute a violation of the sexual stereotyping 
and formal equality principles underlying constitutional law. The 
commonplace, stick-figure signage reflects blatant sexual stereotyping.29 Few 
women probably recognize themselves as a stick figure wearing a triangle 
dress or skirt.30 Yet, women often have to accept that symbol as reflecting 
themselves as they enter public restrooms.31 Restrooms signs are symbolic 
“Barbie” dolls with their exaggerated and reinforcing sense of what it means to 
                                                                                                                     
/perma.cc/E6JY-P25R]. The propriety of the Obama Administration guidance, however, is 
not the subject of this Article. 
 26 This issue has not yet been raised in the litigation over sex-segregated bathrooms. 
In G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, the plaintiff raised an equal 
protection claim to argue that he, as a transgender male, was entitled to use the men’s 
restroom even if the Department of Education guidance did not require that result. See G.G. 
ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 738 (E.D. Va. 2015), 
rev’d in part and vacated in part, 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded, 
No. 16-273, 2017 WL 855755 (S. Ct. Mar. 6, 2017) (mem.). But the plaintiff did not 
challenge the segregation of restrooms themselves under the Constitution. Id. at 745. 
 27 See, e.g., G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 716 (4th 
Cir. 2016) (requesting use of the boys’ bathroom as a way to confirm his gender identity), 
vacated and remanded, No. 16-273, 2017 WL 855755 (S. Ct. Mar. 6, 2017) (mem.). 
 28 Id.  
 29 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (recognizing the sexual 
stereotyping theory under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). For further discussion 
of the harms perpetuated by sex-segregated restrooms, see infra Part III.B. 
 30 Although not all bathroom signage features the same images, my review of stock 
images suggests that the woman nearly always is wearing a dress or skirt of some sort, and 
the man is always clothed in long pants. See GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/search?q= 
male+female+bathroom+sign+images&biw=1260&bih=776&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa
=X&ved=0ahUKEwiPl-jHmuzPAhXJLSYKHV1OCc4Q_AUIBigB [https://perma.cc/YZZ 
9-M8CP] (images resulting from a Google search on Jan. 11, 2017). One exception is a 
handicapped-accessibility sign, which clearly indicates it is “inclusive.” See ADA SIGN 
DEPOT, https://encryptedtbn2.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcRZMyAzz0d_cpXBFPa 
MK3oZA8PIDHaktbCnHpdiqn72Y6mBYoeZ [https://perma.cc/M24S-9Y3N]. 
 31 See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The 
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 57 (1995). 
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be “female.”32 Even if the stick-figure, restroom signage were to change, 
women and men must needlessly sort themselves by gender each time they use 
a public restroom and comply with the gender-based privacy norms within 
those spaces.33 Those privacy norms also reflect sexual stereotyping.34 
Further, contemporary public restrooms violate principles of formal equality, 
as they echo the educational segregation of the past when students lined up by 
sex each time they entered the school building35 and perpetuate a type of all-
male private club by excluding women from business, social, and political 
interactions with men.36 
Part II of this Article will trace the complicated mixture of moralistic, 
gendered, racial, and class concerns that underlie the history of the 
construction of sex-segregated restrooms. These historical roots can explain 
the placement and design of restrooms in contemporary public spaces. Part III 
will argue that sex-segregated restrooms constitute an unconstitutional, sex-
                                                                                                                     
 32 Barbie dolls are anatomically impossible. See, e.g., Galia Slayen, The Scary Reality 
of a Real-Life Barbie Doll, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/galia-
slayen/the-scary-reality-of-a-re_b_845239.html [https://perma.cc/SR8K-C2G5] (last 
updated June 8, 2011). 
 33 See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing different privacy norms for male and female 
restrooms). 
 34 See infra Part II. 
 35 While this is a strong memory from my own public school days in the 1960s and 
1970s, this practice was apparently not confined to primary schools. See Betty W. Taylor, 
A History of Race and Gender at the University of Florida Levin College of Law 1909-
2001, 54 FLA. L. REV. 495, 501 (2002) (“Clara Floyd Gehan, in a biography, describes her 
first day experience at the law school as ‘quite stressful as all the students (male) lined up 
outside the law school building and formed two lines through which she had to traverse in 
order to enter.’” (quoting Clara Gehan, First Lady of the Law School Retires, EIGHTH JUD. 
CIRC. B. ASS’N NEWSL., Jan. 1989, at 13)). It is also possible that my description of this 
experience being “in the past” may be inaccurate, although such a practice would be 
inconsistent with Title IX’s rules against sex segregation in public education. Title IX 
states: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1681(a) (2012). 
 36 See Miriam A. Cherry, Exercising the Right to Public Accommodations: The 
Debate over Single-Sex Health Clubs, 52 ME. L. REV. 97, 102 (2000). The Clinton–Trump 
political campaign reminded us of the male conversations that may occur in what are 
described as “locker rooms” but apparently extend to all-male busses on movie sets. See 
David A. Fahrenthold, Trump Recorded Having Extremely Lewd Conversation About 
Women in 2005, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/tru 
mp-recorded-having-extremely-lewd-conversation-about-women-in-2005/2016/10/07/3b9c 
e776-8cb4-11e6-bf8a-3d26847eeed4_story.html [https://perma.cc/3M54-6RZX] (transcript 
of the “locker room” conversation). These conversations are apparently affected by the 
absence of women from these spaces. When Donald Trump left the locker room of the bus, 
and entered a space with a woman, he changed his demeanor to conform to public norms. 
See id. That kind of locker room distinction is facilitated by sex segregation. Nonetheless, 
the sex segregation of locker room spaces is beyond the scope of this Article although it 
may cause harms similar to those discussed in this Article. 
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based harm that cannot be justified under contemporary constitutional, sex 
discrimination doctrine. While other authors have posited that it is a violation 
of sex-based equality principles to sex segregate restrooms,37 few authors have 
considered how this claim would be articulated as a constitutionally-based 
argument.38 This Article will argue that the privacy and safety justifications 
that are offered to defend this practice rely on impermissible sexist and 
heteronormative understandings of privacy and safety. Part IV will offer a 
novel remedy for this constitutional harm by suggesting that we should flip the 
default rules. We should transition towards making large, communal public 
restrooms available to “all-comers,” with a variety of private toileting options, 
as well as have available a limited number of single-stall restrooms. This 
solution would allow anyone to pick an entirely private option of a single stall 
while not forcing everyone to sex identify as a precondition to entering a 
communal restroom. The stick-figure signage of sex segregation would 
become an historical relic. 
II. THE EMERGENCE AND ENTRENCHMENT OF SEX-SEGREGATED 
RESTROOMS 
A. The History of the Public Restroom 
Today, we think of restrooms in retail stores and restaurants as “public” 
restrooms because they are outside the home.39 But, historically, “public” 
restrooms referred only to restrooms created in noncommercial, public 
spaces40 for the use of people who did not yet have a toilet in their home.41 
The story of the development of the public restroom encompasses 
considerations of race, class, moralism, and gender.  
When cities installed public urinals in the nineteenth century, the 
“facilities were intended to stop men from stinking up the streets and exposing 
                                                                                                                     
 37 See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, Why Not Abolish Laws of Urinary Segregation?, in 
TOILET: PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS OF SHARING 211, 215–16 (Harvey Molotch 
& Laura Noren eds., 2010). It is also possible that bathroom rules constitute a violation of 
freedom of speech or freedom of association principles. See generally Timothy Zick, 
Bathroom Bills, the Free Speech Clause, and Transgender Equality, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2017). That argument goes beyond the scope of this Article. 
 38 See, e.g., Kelly Levy, Note, Equal, But Still Separate?: The Constitutional Debate 
of Sex-Segregated Public Restrooms in the Twenty-First Century, 32 WOMEN’S RTS. L. 
REP. 248, 251–52 (2011); Alex More, Note, Coming Out of the Water Closet: The Case 
Against Sex Segregated Bathrooms, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 297, 305–15 (2008). 
 39 Thus, the transgender fight for the use of restrooms often challenges the rules at 
work or commercial establishments rather than facilities created by local government for 
the use of its citizens. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th 
Cir. 2007) (concerning a transgender, female bus driver who was fired because she insisted 
on using women’s restrooms while driving her bus route). 
 40 Baldwin, supra note 2, at 270. 
 41 Id. at 266–67. 
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their genitals while urinating against convenient walls. Many nineteenth-
century facilities did not accommodate women, who were not known for such 
indiscreet behavior.”42 The construction of public restrooms was initially an 
urban phenomenon in response to the “stench of feces and rotting garbage,” 
especially in densely populated areas.43  
One of the earliest public restrooms was built in Astor Place in New York 
City in 1869.44 It included a men’s restroom with “three stalls for urination 
and two seats, but without stall doors for privacy.”45 The women’s restroom, 
which ended up being comparatively underutilized, included two stalls and a 
washbasin with little privacy.46 It is hard to know if women shunned this 
public restroom because of the limited privacy or the cramped space, which 
could have proven challenging for middle-class women who might be wearing 
crinolines or bustles.47 
The notion of sex-segregated privacy took some time to evolve. “Poorer 
people in tenements used communal privies.”48 Even in middle-class homes, 
which might contain indoor plumbing, it was common to find two-seat privies 
with men and women comfortable with relieving themselves in the view of 
others.49 “Urinating men, like defecating horses, were an everyday sight on the 
street.”50 
The sex segregation of public toilets emerged consistently with the 
development of nineteenth-century middle-class moralism.51 “The nineteenth-
century, urban middle class increasingly viewed all forms of bodily restraint as 
essential to respectability.”52 It was important to conceal “organic processes” 
like nose-blowing, coughing, scratching, urinating, and defecating.53 It was 
also thought that women were the weaker sex and needed sex-segregated 
facilities at work, for example, because they might have “sudden attacks of 
                                                                                                                     
 42 Id. at 266. 
 43 Id. at 266–67. 
 44 Id. at 268. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Baldwin, supra note 2, at 268–69. 
 47 Id. at 269. 
 48 Id. at 266. 
 49 Id. at 267. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Sheila Jeffreys, The Politics of the Toilet: A Feminist Response to the Campaign to 
‘Degender’ A Women’s Space, 45 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 42, 42 (2014) (stating that 
feminists often argue that “the idea of segregating women’s toilets is reactionary and was 
the result of nineteenth century moralism”); see also TRANSGENDER LAW CTR., PEEING IN 
PEACE: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR TRANSGENDER ACTIVISTS AND ALLIES 3 (2005) (“Over 150 
years ago, only wealthy people could afford bathrooms in their homes and poor people 
were forced to use insufficient, non-hygienic public toilets.”). 
 52 Baldwin, supra note 2, at 267. 
 53 Id. 
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dizziness, fainting or other symptoms of illness, for whose use provision 
should be made in the form of rest or emergency rooms.”54 
The sex segregation of restrooms also reflected a heightened interest in 
segregating middle-class men and women, generally, in public life. Hotels 
often offered separate entrances for men and women.55 “Women’s entrances to 
hotels led to more secluded parlors, often one floor up, with comfortable 
seating, carpets and drapes.”56 And a hotel’s washroom might be for “public 
use” because other restrooms were available in the private suites on the upper 
floors.57 The “public” would be limited to “[w]ell-dressed people [who] used 
hotel lobbies and parlors as places to meet, loiter and people-watch, even if 
they were not checked in as guests.”58 Similarly, department stores 
increasingly offered opulent restrooms to their female customers but class-
segregated their clientele by offering “‘bargain basements’ to serve poorer 
people” who would not be likely to enter the upper floors that contained the 
high quality restroom facilities.59 The department stores made the restrooms 
available because they understood that women would not be likely to frequent 
their businesses unless they had a place to use a toilet.60  
In spaces where the social classes and ethnic groups might mix, like 
railroad stations, there was special attention to sex and ethnic segregation.61 
Foreign immigrants might be assigned their own second-class facilities with 
“waiting rooms complete with dining, restroom and laundry facilities.”62 Not 
only were women offered their own restroom space but also there was special 
attention paid to enhancing the privacy of these spaces so that “[n]o one 
looking into the women’s waiting room should be able to glimpse that sacred 
portal.”63 
Civic groups began to push for more sanitary public toilets in the early 
twentieth century as people came to argue that public filth “‘demoralized’ the 
poor” and “discouraged immigrants’ assimilation into American culture.”64 
Health and morality became connected in the public mind with increased legal 
attention on the need to protect the physical well-being of women by limiting 
their working hours, fighting prostitution, and preventing teenage 
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promiscuity.65 Writing in 1908, the United States Supreme Court invoked 
separate spheres ideology to uphold limitations on women’s working hours in 
consideration of women’s putative frailty, the need to preserve the “well-being 
of the race” and “to protect her from the greed as well as the passion of 
man.”66 The reference to the “well-being of the race” was meant to refer to the 
white race.67 The moral tone of this justification is unmistakable—save her 
from the greed and passion of men. It is not surprising that public restrooms, 
constructed around the same time, would be quite attentive to shielding 
middle-class women from public view. 
Further evidence of the influence of notions of morality on restroom 
construction is the connection between those restrooms and the alcohol-
prohibition movement. Before noncommercial, public restrooms existed, the 
“saloon” was often the only place to find a restroom (and it would have been 
off limits to women).68 Some were concerned that men found it difficult to 
abstain from alcohol if they had to enter a saloon to urinate.69 Prohibition 
advocates argued that “[r]eformers could undermine the saloon’s power . . . by 
developing alternatives like coffee shops, singing clubs, and of course comfort 
stations.”70 When the Eighteenth Amendment was ratified and Prohibition 
began in 1919, there was increased pressure to build noncommercial, public 
restrooms so that working-class men would not flock to hotels and stores to 
use a restroom.71 
Even as noncommercial, public restrooms became more common in the 
early twentieth century, women often avoided them.72 Middle-class women, 
who could find restrooms at private department stores or hotels, may have 
avoided the noncommercial, public restrooms out of a sense of discomfort, 
invasion of privacy, avoidance of the poor, or concern for safety.73 With 
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women not often using the noncommercial, public restrooms, advocacy for the 
development of such spaces often diminished.74  
Nonetheless, some women fought against the limited availability of 
commercial and noncommercial public restrooms for women as part of an 
effort to improve women’s opportunities in the public spheres of work and 
shopping.75 While the design and construction of these restrooms may have 
reflected nineteenth-century moralistic views, the very existence of these 
restrooms may also have been a part of women’s attempt to gain greater 
equality.76 Two telling examples of long-standing gender inequality in the 
legal and political spheres were the absence of a women’s restroom in the 
chambers of the United States Supreme Court until 198177 and on the floor of 
the United States Senate until 1992.78 As African-Americans could not readily 
travel in the southern United States before the enactment of Title II of the Civil 
Rights Act of 196479 due to a lack of availability of public toilets, and 
individuals with disabilities found themselves unable to readily travel before 
the enactment of the ADA in 199080 due to a lack of accessible toilet facilities, 
women in the early twentieth century found themselves unable to “access 
work, education or public space on terms of equality whilst there are no 
women’s toilets.”81  
Because of the enduring reality of men having more access to public 
toilets than women, there has been an increased focus in recent years on “potty 
parity” laws that would ensure that women have access to adequate toilet 
facilities.82 This argument about the lack of toilets for women is different than 
the argument about whether and why toilets were sex segregated. Sex 
segregation was historically based on a combination of concerns about 
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privacy, class divisions, and “separate spheres ideology.”83 The impetus to 
have publicly available restrooms for women, at all, however, may be seen as 
part of a political movement towards gender-based equality.84 
In the second half of the twentieth century, noncommercial, public 
restrooms became much less common and people came to think of “the use of 
the toilet . . . to be the result of an agreement between an individual and a 
business.”85 But the sex-segregated privacy and class sensibilities that were 
part of the development of the public restroom remain. The “bargain 
basement”86 is still on the ground level of a department store with the more 
upscale offerings often situated near an expensive restaurant with an elegant 
women’s restroom. The more expensive commercial establishments seem to 
have the most privacy protection within the restroom facility for women.87 
Thus, notions of women’s frailty and enhanced need for privacy may still 
survive in our conception of sex-segregated restrooms. 
B. The Fear of “Unisex” Bathrooms 
Despite the decline in availability of noncommercial, public restrooms in 
the mid-twentieth century and the absence of any suggestion that public 
restrooms would become sex integrated, the sex segregation of public 
restrooms took front and center stage as an argument to derail the proposed 
federal ERA in the 1970s and 1980s.88 When the ERA was being considered, 
three of the most common objections were that women would be subject to the 
draft and allowed to enter combat, same-sex marriage would become 
permissible, and public restrooms would become “unisex.”89 Although those 
arguments helped defeat the federal ERA in 1982, “three states shy of 
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ratification,”90 two of those outcomes have largely come to pass through 
constitutional litigation and political activism.91 While we have made 
significant political and legal advances with respect to the combat and 
marriage issues, the fear of “unisex bathrooms” has not dissipated. 
ERA opponents exploited the specter of “unisex bathrooms” as part of 
their opposition to the ERA, invoking the fear that gender differences would 
disappear if men and women used the same communal restrooms.92 It was 
seemingly important to ERA opponents that men and women reaffirmed their 
gender identity on a daily basis by using restrooms demarcated by male-
female stick figures. Their use of the term “unisex” did not accurately describe 
the sex-integrated restrooms, which they seemingly feared, because more than 
one sex would, in fact, be able to use such sex-integrated restrooms; it 
arguably reflected their fear that men and women would become “unisex” as 
sex-mandated segregation dissipated. In other words, ERA opponents may 
have thought that socially-created structures like sex-segregated public 
restrooms are important mechanisms to promote distinctions on the basis of 
sex. The “unisex bathroom” mantra reflected a fear of “unisex people,” i.e., 
people who do not identify with bipolar conceptions of male and female. 
Ironically, the traditional configuration of public restrooms is unisex because 
only one sex uses a particular restroom. 
Anticipating the “unisex bathroom” argument against the ERA, the 
leading article explaining the potential impact of the ratification of the ERA 
stated that ratification of the ERA would not end the sex segregation of public 
restrooms.93 Writing in 1971, this is the logic that Barbara Brown and her co-
authors used to contend that sex-segregated bathrooms would survive 
enforcement of the ERA:  
[I]t is clear that one important part of the right of privacy is to be free from 
official coercion in sexual relations. This would have a bearing upon the 
operation of some aspects of the Equal Rights Amendment. Thus, under 
current mores, disrobing in front of the other sex is usually associated with 
sexual relationships. Hence the right of privacy would justify police practices 
by which a search involving the removal of clothing could be performed only 
by a police officer of the same sex as the person searched. Similarly the right 
of privacy would permit the separation of the sexes in public rest rooms, 
segregation by sex in sleeping quarters of prisons or similar public 
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institutions, and appropriate segregation of living conditions in the armed 
forces.94 
Notice how they justified the continuation of single-sex restrooms after the 
adoption of the ERA. After adoption of the ERA, one would continue to have 
the right to (1) be free of sexual coercion and (2) not to disrobe in front of 
someone who would be considered a possible (hetero)sexual partner.95 Even 
though women’s restrooms universally have private stalls that preclude anyone 
(male or female) from being able to see a woman “disrobing,”96 this 
superficial argument was used to explain why sex-segregated bathrooms 
would still be constitutional after the adoption of the ERA. These were not 
fringe scholars making this argument in an obscure journal; they were pre-
eminent constitutional law scholars making this argument in the pages of the 
Yale Law Journal to assist the ratification of the ERA by explaining its 
(limited) consequences.97 These scholars proclaimed that the public need not 
worry about women serving in combat, same-sex marriage, or sex-integrated 
restrooms if the ERA were adopted.98 
When the ERA was being considered, some states were so concerned 
about the “unisex bathroom” problem that they added bathroom exceptions to 
their nondiscrimination laws.99 These preemptive moves were similar to the 
many states that enacted “mini-DOMAs” out of concern that same-sex 
marriage would become possible in some states.100 These mini-DOMAs were 
ruled unconstitutional when the Supreme Court ruled in favor of marriage 
equality,101 but these state efforts reflected the deep-seated prejudice against 
marriage equality. If the federal courts were to rule that state-mandated, sex 
segregation in restrooms is unconstitutional, then these special bathroom 
exceptions would have to be struck down as well.  
Another way to understand the 1971 article on the ERA is that it reflected 
recognition that the country was not yet ready for women in combat, same-sex 
marriage or sex-integrated restrooms. But, as we have seen in the 
transformation towards women serving in combat102 and the availability of 
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same-sex marriage,103 those changes were possible and were also crucial to the 
advancement of sex-based equality. The current sex-based configuration of 
restrooms is not inevitable; changing that well-accepted configuration is 
essential to dismantling the sexual stereotyping that underlies gender-based 
inequality. 
The need to challenge sex-segregated restrooms is analogous to the need 
to dismantle Jim Crow by challenging the wholesale segregation by race. 
When Homer Plessy brought his original challenge to Louisiana’s law that 
required racial segregation of railways,104 he was not necessarily seeking to 
dismantle Jim Crow. He argued his “mixture of colored blood was not 
discernible” so that he should be able to board the coach reserved for 
whites.105 His argument is parallel to the transgender, male student who 
requests to use the restroom that is consistent with his self-identity as a man. 
Homer Plessy wanted to identify as white for the purpose of boarding the 
railroad car.106 His case, however, came to represent a claim for the 
dismantling of Jim Crow, especially when it was overturned in Brown v. 
Board of Education.107 In some sense, the transition from Plessy to Brown can 
be understood as a transition from seeking to “pass” as white to seeking to 
dismantle the racial hierarchy itself by eliminating de jure segregation. Sex 
discrimination doctrine needs to make the same kind of transformation. It is 
not enough for a transgender student to choose a particular sex-segregated 
restroom as an aspect of his or her gender identification. We should all be able 
to choose a restroom without engaging in gender identification. 
III. PUBLIC RESTROOMS AS A CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION 
A. State Action 
In order for a sex-based harm to be a constitutionally-based harm, there 
needs to be “state action” under the Fourteenth Amendment.108 Thus, one must 
initially ask the question whether sex-segregated bathrooms are the result of 
state action. The answer to that question is clearly, “yes.” Indoor toilets at 
workplaces were not initially segregated by sex; Massachusetts became the 
first state in 1887 to require sex segregation of “water closets” at factories and 
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other workplaces.109 Currently, most states require the sex segregation of 
public restrooms with “only a few exceptions for this rule, including private 
facilities and occupancies in which fifteen or fewer people are 
employed. . . . The use of the public washroom of the ‘wrong’ sex might even 
lead to arrest.”110 Federal regulations require that places of employment offer 
sex-segregated restrooms.111 State law also requires sex-segregated restrooms 
at gas stations, mines, schools, restaurants, hotels, and swimming pools.112 
B. The Harm Created by Sex-Segregated Restrooms 
1. Introduction 
Rather than argue that sex-segregated restrooms do not constitute sex 
discrimination, one could imagine a state actor arguing that it is a harmless 
example of sex discrimination, which need not invoke heightened scrutiny. As 
in Plessy v. Ferguson, the state could argue that the “enforced separation” of 
the two sexes does not stamp women with a “badge of inferiority.”113 
Paraphrasing the Plessy majority, as applied to the context of sex-segregated 
restrooms: “If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the [sex 
segregation], but solely because [women] choose[] to put that construction 
upon it.”114 The routine acceptance of sex-segregated public restrooms, 
however, does not dissipate the harms that result from this sex segregation. 
Those harms include both a violation of the principle of formal equality as 
well as an anti-stereotyping principle.115 As we will see below, both principles 
can exist simultaneously and together contribute to an understanding of sex 
discrimination, constitutional principles.  
When Ruth Bader Ginsburg decided to bring some sex-equality cases that 
used men as plaintiffs in the 1970s, she was clearly marshaling principles of 
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formal equality to say that discrimination against men was as harmful as 
discrimination against women.116 In fact, that has become the “canonical 
account[]” of Ginsburg’s litigation strategy.117 Nonetheless, rather than think 
of Reed v. Reed as merely a formal equality case, we should also think of that 
case as challenging the sex-role stereotype that assumed that a man should be 
the administrator of an estate.118 Similarly, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld should 
be considered a case about a man who was the primary child caretaker and the 
wife who was the primary breadwinner.119 When Stephen Wiesenfeld’s wife 
died giving birth to their first child, he was not able to attain Social Security 
benefits to stay home with the child.120 In ruling for Stephen Wiesenfeld, the 
Court held that Congress should not be permitted to enact legislation based on 
the assumption that mothers, but not fathers, should be able to stay out of the 
paid labor force after the birth of a child.121  
The point in seeing the sex-stereotyping theory underlying much of the 
Court’s constitutional, sex discrimination doctrine is that it allows us to better 
understand the kind of harm reflected in these cases. While it is true that some 
cases involved a loss of a certain tangible, financial benefit, such as 
Wiesenfeld’s death benefit, others involved the noneconomic harm of being 
expected to conform to a gender-based norm. Sally Reed, who was a female 
plaintiff in one of the early sex-equality cases, wanted the opportunity to 
administer her son’s estate after he committed suicide rather than have that 
role automatically go to her estranged husband.122 It is unlikely that the 
material benefits, if any, of administering the estate were a motivation for her 
in bringing the legal action. 
Sex discrimination doctrine, itself, reflects the importance of both formal 
equality and an anti-sexual stereotyping theory when it articulates why 
heightened scrutiny is appropriate in this context. In Craig v. Boren, another 
case brought by a male plaintiff to advance formal equality, the Court 
explained that previous decisions relied on the determination that state statutes 
often fostered “‘old notions’ of role typing and preparing boys for their 
expected performance in the economic and political worlds.”123 It was the 
prevalence of those gender-based stereotypes in contemporary society that 
persuaded the Court in Craig to finally announce that it was using some form 
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of heightened scrutiny in gender discrimination cases rather than mere rational 
basis scrutiny.124 That articulation of heightened scrutiny, however, also 
clearly reflected strong principles of formal equality when the Court 
announced for the first time that “classifications by gender must serve 
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to 
achievement of those objectives.”125 While the degree of scrutiny may have 
heightened over the years to an even stronger formal equality rule,126 the Court 
also continues to emphasize that the state’s justifications “must not rely on 
overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences 
of males and females.”127 As Ruth Bader Ginsburg has moved from the lead 
lawyer in the early sex discrimination cases to the leading jurist in recent sex 
discrimination cases, the anti-stereotyping principle has become even more 
firmly embedded in constitutional doctrine as part of the core justification for a 
heightened scrutiny doctrine that reinforces formal equality.  
2. Sex-Segregated Bathrooms as Sexual Stereotyping 
Sexual stereotyping is at the core of the sex segregation of public 
restrooms. While state or commercial entities might justify the sex segregation 
of restrooms by noting the different ways that men and women urinate, those 
biological differences, in fact, have little to do with the sex segregation of 
restrooms. In the home, men and women are able to use the same restroom 
design. Outside the home, it might be convenient and efficient to offer urinals 
to men, and toilet stalls with small trash cans for men or women, but these 
design options have nothing to do with the need to sex segregate public 
restrooms. Urinals, like toilets, could have privacy barriers. Toilet stalls 
already have privacy barriers. While it may be true that men have been 
socialized to urinate standing up, that difference does not even require entirely 
different construction designs.128  
The real explanation for sex segregation of restrooms flows from the 
racial, ethnic, class, and gender stereotypes underlying the rules and policies 
governing restrooms. As we saw in Part II.A, the development of sex-
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Military Women’s Urinary Patterns, Practices, and Complications in Deployment Settings, 
33 UROLOGIC NURSING 61, 66 (2013). 
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segregated restrooms accompanied race and class segregation. The privacy 
justification is actually a pretext for the articulation of gender stereotypes 
about the inappropriateness of men being exposed to women’s private, bodily 
functions.129 If all public restrooms had fully enclosed private stalls, akin to 
the current configuration of women’s restrooms, many men would probably 
still be uncomfortable being in close proximity to a woman, especially as she 
might change a menstrual pad. Taboos against men being exposed to women’s 
menstruation cycles are persistent and longstanding.130 In 2015, then-
presidential candidate Donald Trump seemingly alluded to a woman’s 
menstrual cycle when he insulted Republican debate moderator Megyn Kelly 
by saying she had “[b]lood coming out of her wherever.”131 His comment 
reflected the continuing discomfort that men may feel in even thinking about 
women’s private bodily processes.132 The history of public restroom 
construction suggests that men and women are not merely segregated to 
protect them from seeing each other’s genitals. They are sex segregated to 
keep men and women protected from even hearing each other’s “organic 
processes.”133  
The construction of restrooms has been part of the broader “gender 
policing” that is fundamental to society. For white women, who have had 
access to sex-segregated restroom facilities since the late nineteenth century, 
these facilities can be seen as reflecting protection of the cult of true 
womanhood,134 with its heightened concern for women’s privacy, frailty, 
                                                                                                                     
 129 See supra Part II.A. 
 130 See Irene Bruce, There Will (Not) Be Blood, GRINNELL C.: HIST. MED. AM. (July 
23, 2015), http://lewiscar.sites.grinnell.edu/HistoryofMedicine/uncategorized/there-will-
not-be-blood/ [https://perma.cc/9WKU-3RTG]. 
 131 See Holly Yan, Donald Trump’s ‘Blood’ Comment About Megyn Kelly Draws 
Outrage, CNN POL. (quoting Donald Trump), http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/08/politics/don 
ald-trump-cnn-megyn-kelly-comment/ [https://perma.cc/2P42-L2L7] (last updated Aug. 8, 
2015) .  
 132 After then-candidate Hillary Clinton took a somewhat long bathroom break at a 
presidential debate, the Washington Post reported that then-candidate Donald Trump, at a 
campaign rally, said: “‘I know where she went – it’s disgusting, I don’t want to talk about 
it,’ Trump said, screwing up his face, as the crowd laughed and cheered. ‘No, it’s too 
disgusting. Don’t say it, it’s disgusting.’” Jenna Johnson, Donald Trump Says Clinton’s 
Bathroom Break During the Debate Is ‘Too Disgusting’ to Talk About, WASH. POST (Dec. 
21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/12/21/donald-
trump-calls-hillary-clinton-disgusting-for-using-the-restroom-during-a-debate/?utm_term=. 
1fc7aa0d8507 [https://perma.cc/67QB-V6KN]. Those comments suggest he found the 
thought of women’s bodily functions as “disgusting” even when not tied to menstruation 
(since Clinton was obviously too old to be menstruating). 
 133 See Baldwin, supra note 2, at 267. 
 134 See Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820 - 1860, 18 AM. Q. 151, 
152 (1966) (discussing how women were judged on the basis of their “piety, purity, 
submissiveness and domesticity”). 
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cleanliness, and need for moral protection.135 Women’s restrooms have been 
historically constructed to provide more privacy from the entrance to the 
interior, as well as more privacy within the structure itself, than men’s 
restrooms. Thus, it was considered inappropriate even to be able to see the 
“feet and lower parts of the skirts of females” when they were in the 
restroom.136 In fact, it was even considered inappropriate to be able to see a 
middle-class woman entering the restroom.137 The sex-segregated restroom 
was therefore part of the larger separate spheres discourse that was rampant in 
the nineteenth century. 
The contemporary division of restrooms into “male” and “female” also 
reinforces gender policing by reinforcing the myth that all individuals readily 
fit into the male or female category.138 Both the transgender rights movement 
and the debate about intersex athletes challenge those rigid norms. 
Transgender high school students, like Gavin Grimm, have been forced to 
choose between the binary “male” and “female” restrooms as they outwardly 
transition their gender identity.139 Similarly, intersex athletes like Maria 
Patiño, who has XY chromosomes accompanied by androgen insensitivity 
which causes her to look conventionally female while having XY 
chromosomes, must face public debate about which of the two binary 
categories fits her.140 
Before one enters a restroom, one often looks up and glances at a stick 
figure that depicts males and females in a stereotypical fashion.141 Even if the 
                                                                                                                     
 135 For an excellent discussion of the cult of true womanhood and how it legitimized 
the sexual abuse of African-American women, see Harris, supra note 67, at 341, examining 
how “[d]efining true womanhood along a line of racial caste had the effect of sharply 
delineating both race and gender on premises that enshrined racial patriarchy.” 
 136 Kogan, supra note 54, at 48 (quoting 1 REPORT ON CONDITION OF WOMAN AND 
CHILD WAGE-EARNERS IN THE UNITED STATES IN 19 VOLUMES, S. DOC. NO.61-645, at 371 
(1910)). 
 137 Id. at 48–49 (“[M]erely shielding a woman while she was in the process of using 
the water-closet was not enough. Victorian modesty was threatened if a woman could even 
be seen entering the facility.”). 
 138 See generally Nancy Levit, Keeping Feminism in Its Place: Sex Segregation and 
the Domestication of Female Academics, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 775 (2001) (discussing the 
unconscious bias that accompanies sex segregation). 
 139 See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 716 (4th Cir. 
2016), vacated and remanded, No. 16-273, 2017 WL 855755 (S. Ct. Mar. 6, 2017) (mem.). 
 140 See More, supra note 38, at 299. 
 141 There is wide variation to these depictions. At ethnic restaurants, for example, it is 
common to have various outfits or costumes on the men or women to signify the gendered 
differentiation. The triangle dress is the most common, but not only, demarcation found in 
public restrooms to distinguish between the men’s and women’s facility. For variations on 
these pictograms, see Marissa, Go Where? Sex, Gender, and Toilets, SOC’Y PAGES (Sept. 2, 
2010), https://thesocietypages.org/socimages/2010/09/02/guest-post-go-where-sex-gender-
and-toilets/ [https://perma.cc/2D4J-528E]. For discussions on what future restroom 
pictograms could look like, see Kerry Lauerman & Chris Barber, What Should Be the 
Restroom Sign of the Future?, WASH. POST (June 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.co 
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iconic stick figures are absent, our brains are required to engage in gender 
sorting before we enter the restroom.142 “Female” or “male,” we think to 
ourselves as we enter the appropriate space each day.143 Thus, not 
surprisingly, parents who opposed Gavin Grimm using the male restroom 
argued that his action might signify that “non-transgender boys would come to 
school wearing dresses in order to gain access to the girls’ restrooms.”144 Were 
they really concerned with boys seeking to use the girls’ restrooms or were 
they actually concerned that boys might want to wear dresses? These parents 
implicitly understood that sex-segregated restrooms were a type of gender 
policing. They did not want the school district to relax its gender policing. The 
long-standing case law against sexual stereotyping under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, as well as the anti-sexual stereotyping theory that 
underlies constitutional, sex discrimination doctrine,145 however, should 
preclude the state from engaging in this kind of pervasive, gender policing.146  
Ironically, the recent spate of cases involving transgender students who 
want to use a particular single-sex restroom reinforces the connection between 
restrooms and gender socialization. For example, Gavin Grimm’s doctor 
argued that the school district’s insistence that Gavin use a single stall rather 
than the boys’ restroom “accentuat[ed] his ‘otherness,’ undermining his 
identity formation, and impeding his medically necessary social transition 
process.”147 As part of his gender transition, Gavin wanted to look up and see 
the male stick figure as he entered the restroom, because the use of the single-
sex restroom was a part of his gender-identity formation.148 Similarly, the 
parents of some of the other male children were afraid that relaxing the norms 
for restroom access would cause their boys to abandon their mandated gender 
roles and start coming to school wearing dresses.149 Thus, even as some 
people might argue that sex segregation is utterly harmless, others are lined up 
                                                                                                                     
m/news/post-nation/wp/2016/06/06/what-should-be-the-restroom-sign-of-the-future/ [http 
s://perma.cc/288K-UAEW]. 
 142 This kind of repeated, gender sorting could help lead to the concept of “implicit 
bias,” which is increasingly acknowledged as a factor in the perpetuation of discrimination. 
See generally Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific 
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945 (2006) (recognizing the importance of beliefs in 
shaping behaviors even if those beliefs are not consciously endorsed). 
 143 Braverman, supra note 78, at 46 (“We visit washrooms several times a day. Based 
on an average of eight minutes a day, we will all spend roughly 3,650 hours or 150 days in 
the washroom in the course of our lives.”). 
 144 Grimm, 822 F.3d at 716. 
 145 See supra Part III.B.1. 
 146 See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (recognizing 
sexual stereotyping as a violation of Title VII). 
 147 Grimm, 822 F.3d at 727–28 (Davis, J., concurring) (quoting Doctor Randi Ettner, a 
psychologist specializing in “working with children and adolescents with gender 
dysphoria”). 
 148 Id. at 716–17 (majority opinion). 
 149 See id. at 716. 
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arguing for stark sex segregation out of recognition of the role that sex-
segregated restrooms play in the socialization of gender. 
3. Women’s Exclusion from All-Male Space 
The harm from the sex segregation of bathrooms, however, is not limited 
to a stereotype harm. Genuine social and business harms flow from this sex 
segregation that can be understood as a more traditional violation of formal 
equality principles. 
At a time when protective labor legislation was emerging, Massachusetts 
became the first state to require that workplace toilet facilities be sex 
segregated.150 While the historical roots of this sex-segregation legislation 
may have been “to protect the weaker body of the woman worker,”151 it has 
been maintained long after such views of women have been largely rebuffed. 
Sex-segregated restrooms endure as spaces where business and social 
interactions inevitably take place. 
The existence of sex-segregated restroom space within the public sphere is 
nearly universally accepted. If job categories were sex segregated at a 
workplace, people would quickly complain.152 Given the number of times a 
day we might use a communal restroom at a workplace, educational entity, or 
public arena, it is hard to measure the lack of opportunity for cross-sex social 
or business interactions. Using the restroom is not merely about using the 
restroom; it is also about the conversations that may occur in that space.153 
Within places of employment, for example, casual or even business-related 
conversations do take place in sex-segregated restroom spaces that help sustain 
the “old boys network.”154 For example, Professor Mary Anne Case recites a 
                                                                                                                     
 150 Act of Mar. 24, 1887, ch. 103, § 2, 1887 Mass. Acts 668, 669. For a discussion of 
the Massachusetts law, see Kogan, supra note 54, at 15 & n.51, 39. 
 151 Kogan, supra note 54, at 41. 
 152 See, e.g., Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 859 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(successful challenge to sex-segregated job categories). 
 153 In my attempt to ask men about how much conversation occurs in restrooms and 
my attempt to find articles on the subject, I have found a wide range of views. As the 
following reveals, however, it is clear that some men engage in business-related talk in a 
restroom. See Kittyprecious, Why Do Some Men Hang Out to Talk in Office Restrooms?, 
ASK METAFILTER (June 23, 2008, 8:06 AM), http://ask.metafilter.com/94772/Why-do-
some-men-hang-out-to-talk-in-office-restrooms [https://perma.cc/P8ZF-ZKN7]. In my life-
long experience using women’s restrooms, I can report that women often do chat in 
restrooms with a variety of conversational topics. Although an argument about the harm to 
men from being excluded from women’s restrooms is not at the heart of my argument, I 
would acknowledge that men are arguably harmed by missing the common social 
interactions that occur among women in public restrooms. 
 154 Although it is a mere anecdote, I still remember encouraging a female legal writing 
instructor to apply for a tenure-track position in a restroom at a university where I taught. 
When she achieved that higher rank, I often wondered what would have happened if we 
had not chatted in the restroom.  
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story of a litigation partner at a firm who would say to his male colleagues, 
“Come pee with me.”155 
Further, the male restroom has historically been a site of male political 
interactions. Then-presidential candidate John Kerry said that he was surprised 
at the “number of people who tried to introduce themselves to him in the men’s 
room.”156 Thus, it should come as no surprise that the United States did not 
even have a women’s restroom on the Senate floor until 1992;157 no one 
expected women to enter or mingle in that political space at all. Their 
exclusion from the restroom was symbolic of their exclusion from the political 
space itself.  
Women’s exclusion from all-male spaces may also cause women to have 
inadequate information to assess a man’s suitability for political office. 
Women have a right to hear the lewd or demeaning comments that men might 
make in those spaces, as well as engage in more positive interactions with 
them. For example, the lewd and demeaning comments about women that 
then-presidential candidate Donald Trump made while in the all-male setting 
of a work-related bus158 may have heightened the gender gap in the 
presidential election when female voters gained access to that speech through 
an audio recording and were alarmed by its content.159 More typically, women 
have no opportunity to overhear such conversations. 
Of course, it may also be possible that men might be less inclined to make 
lewd and demeaning comments about women if women were present in 
previously all-male spaces.160 There is a broad literature on how all-male 
                                                                                                                     
 155 Case, supra note 37, at 224. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Braverman, supra note 78, at 60. 
 158 See Fahrenthold, supra note 36. In the tape, Trump’s conversation becomes polite 
and nonsexist as soon as he exits the bus and is in the company of a woman. See id. Trump 
generically described this all-male bus as a “locker room,” although it was not a locker 
room. See Emily Crockett, Trump’s Leaked Comments Aren’t Just “Lewd.” They Describe 
Sexual Assault., VOX (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.vox.com/identities/2016/10/7/13206174/tr 
ump-leaked-lewd-pussy-comments-women-rape-sexual-assault [https://perma.cc/HY64-
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private, all-male space. He did not consider it appropriate for his fitness for political office 
to be judged, in part, by what he said in such an all-male space. See id. 
 159 While Hillary Clinton reportedly received more votes from women than men 
(consistent with recent experiences by Democratic candidates), this gender gap was even 
larger than in recent elections. See Alec Tyson & Shiva Maniam, Behind Trump’s Victory: 
Divisions by Race, Gender, Education, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 9, 2016), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/behind-trumps-victory-divisions-by-race 
-gender-education/ [https://perma.cc/4EZ2-8JQ4]. Thus, overall, gender played a larger 
predictive role than in previous presidential contests with men seemingly less concerned 
than women about Trump’s sexist remarks. Further, men may have been less willing than 
women to vote for a female candidate for President.  
 160 See, e.g., Carol Dyhouse, Troubled Identities: Gender and Status in the History of 
the Mixed College in English Universities Since 1945, 12 WOMEN’S HIST. REV. 169, 179 
(2003). 
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colleges changed when they became coed, with some arguing that men’s 
colleges became more civilized under coeducation, with fewer incidents of 
“gang hooliganism.”161 Intermittent sex-integrated restroom access is 
obviously different than a university offering classes on a sex-integrated basis. 
Nonetheless, there is little doubt that women’s presence in a social 
environment has an effect on speech and behavior.162 If a side effect of sex-
integrated restroom space is that men lose one context in which to make lewd 
or demeaning comments about women, then such a change would have an 
additional positive effect on women’s status in society. 
C. Some Doctrinal Complications  
The constitutional harm argument that has been presented above assumes 
that a court would agree that the sex segregation of public restrooms 
constitutes an act of sex discrimination itself. There is a line of case law, 
which has continued vitality, that suggests that governmentally-imposed sex 
discrimination, when justified by the biological differences between men and 
women, does not constitute sex discrimination for the purpose of constitutional 
law. Support for this argument can be found in Geduldig v. Aiello.163 In an 
often repudiated footnote,164 the Court explained that it did not review the 
state’s exclusion of normal pregnancy from its disability program under 
heightened scrutiny, because “[t]he California insurance program does not 
exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes 
one physical condition—pregnancy—from the list of compensable 
disabilities.”165 Although Justice Ginsburg has argued that the Geduldig case 
is “senseless[],”166 and no longer reflects an appropriate way to think about 
sex discrimination,167 she has also maintained the “inherent differences” line 
of reasoning in her majority opinion in United States v. Virginia. In her 
opinion for the Court, she stated: “‘Inherent differences’ between men and 
women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for 
                                                                                                                     
 161 Id. (quoting the warden of University House, Birmingham). 
 162 See, e.g., Peter Kollock et al., Sex and Power in Interaction: Conversational 
Privileges and Duties, 50 AM. SOC. REV. 34, 42–45 (1985); Lynn Smith-Lovin & Charles 
Brody, Interruptions in Group Discussions: The Effects of Gender and Group 
Composition, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 424, 432–34 (1989).  
 163 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 & n.20 (1974). 
 164 See, e.g., Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Our Other Reproductive Choices: Equality in Sex 
Education, Contraceptive Access, and Work-Family Policy, 56 EMORY L.J. 941, 972 & 
n.102 (2007) (arguing that Geduldig is wrong and that “scholarly consensus is strongly 
critical of Geduldig”); Siegel, supra note 115, at 1892 & n.103 (arguing that the recent 
Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), decision limited Geduldig’s 
reach). 
 165 Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. 
 166 Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 59 (2012) (Ginsburg, J. 
dissenting) (plurality opinion). 
 167 Id. at 59 n.6 (describing the holding in Geduldig as an “embarrass[ment]”).  
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denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an 
individual’s opportunity.”168 
Justice Ginsburg’s recitation of the inherent differences rule admittedly 
creates continued ambiguity in sex discrimination doctrine. Did she mean (as 
in Geduldig) that the acceptance of an inherent differences argument requires 
that the level of scrutiny should be reduced to mere rational basis scrutiny?169 
Or did she mean that a court could consider the articulation of an inherent 
differences argument as a justification for state-mandated sex discrimination 
after the plaintiff established a constitutional harm? Given her prior 
repudiation of Geduldig, the former interpretation seems unlikely. The latter 
interpretation would push this biological argument to the justification stage but 
not lower the level of scrutiny. 
Even if it were true that different treatment based on inherent differences 
does not constitute sex discrimination and therefore lowers the level of 
scrutiny (as in Geduldig), it is hard to see how that rule is relevant to the sex-
segregated bathroom context. Although men and women do have some 
differences in how they urinate, those differences do not necessitate 
differences in the construction of toilets.170 Men and women may prefer 
different toilet styles for urinating, but a restroom need not be sex segregated 
in order to accommodate more than one toilet design (as restrooms typically 
offer one handicap-accessible toilet within a standard restroom). Thus, the sex 
segregation of restrooms does not inevitably result from the typical biological 
differences between how men and women urinate. We could have many 
different toilet designs within a single restroom.171 
The rationales for sex segregation in bathrooms are privacy and safety, not 
biology. In United States v. Virginia, the State tried to assert the inherent 
biological differences argument, but the Court rejected that argument as a 
mere pretext for discrimination.172 One would therefore expect the Court to 
reject the assertion of biological differences as an excuse to avoid the 
heightened scrutiny framework and, instead, require the state to justify that it 
has sufficiently strong reasons to maintain sex-segregated facilities. We need 
to examine whether those justifications should pass muster under the Court’s 
constitutional sex discrimination doctrine. 
                                                                                                                     
 168 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
 169 See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494–96, 496 n.20. 
 170 See generally Anthony & Dufresne, supra note 14 (discussing a variety of toilet 
designs that could equally accommodate men and women). 
 171 That solution would also facilitate the principle of universal design, which is 
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 172 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533–34. 
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D. Justifications for Sex Segregation 
The common explanations for sex-segregated bathrooms are privacy and 
safety. Thus, when Gavin Grimm sought to use the male restroom, parents 
complained “that permitting G.G. to use the boys’ restroom would violate the 
privacy of other students and would lead to sexual assault in restrooms.”173 
Those arguments, however, are based on gendered and heteronormative 
assumptions, which are similar to the discredited arguments used to ban 
openly gay men and lesbians from positions in the military,174 and should no 
longer be acceptable.  
1. Privacy 
The Court’s current jurisprudence can lend some support to a state’s 
privacy argument that it is entitled to sex-segregated restrooms, but closer 
examination of those claims reveal they are vulnerable to challenge. 
The Commonwealth of Virginia raised the privacy argument in United 
States v. Virginia. It argued that privacy was nearly nonexistent in the spartan 
barracks.175 The district court used the privacy rationale to rule in favor of the 
State, finding that co-education would require “[a]llowance for personal 
privacy.”176 The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s conclusion that the 
State had not violated the Constitution but remanded for consideration on three 
issues, including the question of whether “the absence of privacy” would be 
“materially affected by coeducation.”177 On remand, the State argued, and the 
court of appeals agreed, while “applying a heightened intermediate scrutiny 
test,”178 that the State was entitled to meet its interests by continuing to 
exclude women from Virginia Military Institute (VMI) and create a parallel 
program for women at another university.179 The privacy rationale was an 
accepted justification for state-imposed sex segregation under the heightened 
scrutiny framework. 
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals in United States v. 
Virginia but did not address the privacy rationale that was accepted by the 
lower courts.180 Instead, it focused on whether the female-only program that 
                                                                                                                     
 173 See G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 716 (4th Cir. 
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 179 Id. at 1237–41. 
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the State proposed creating was genuinely equal to the one at VMI.181 
Although the majority’s opinion in United States v. Virginia did not directly 
require the State to allow women to enroll at VMI, its blistering criticism of 
the tangible and intangible harm that resulted from women’s exclusion 
suggests that sex integration was the only available remedy.182 Nonetheless, 
the Supreme Court was aware that the all-male facility at VMI had a military-
style residence183 where, presumably, the students would have a lack of 
privacy.  
The majority’s holding in United States v. Virginia says little about how it 
resolved the State’s privacy argument except for a brief comment in a footnote 
that “[a]dmitting women to VMI would undoubtedly require alterations 
necessary to afford members of each sex privacy from the other sex in living 
arrangements.”184 Was the privacy argument outweighed by the harm to 
women? Or was there no genuine state interest in such privacy arguments, 
once minor adjustments were made? Chief Justice Rehnquist’s separate 
concurrence argued that the State should have been able to devise another sex-
segregated program because VMI showed the coed program would have to be 
“fundamentally altered if it admitted women,” in part, because there would 
have to be “new allowances for personal privacy.”185 Because the majority did 
not accept Rehnquist’s views, we must presume the majority disagreed with 
them. The majority’s refusal to embrace Rehnquist’s solution suggests that it 
thought women could not be excluded from VMI merely on the basis of a 
privacy rationale. Nonetheless, the majority opinion does not provide direct 
guidance on the privacy issue; this analysis is by implication.  
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in favor of Gavin Grimm 
does not give us much insight into how it considered the school district’s 
privacy argument. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged the privacy interest in 
sex-segregated restrooms:  
We agree that it has indeed been commonplace and widely accepted to 
separate public restrooms, locker rooms, and shower facilities on the basis of 
sex. We agree that ‘an individual has a legitimate and important interest in 
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bodily privacy such that his or her nude or partially nude body, genitalia, and 
other private parts’ are not involuntarily exposed.186  
But the Fourth Circuit found that this case was merely an administrative 
law case, which did not raise constitutional privacy issues,187 so these 
concerns did not need to be considered in the context of the case.188  
The Grimm district court, however, gave significant consideration to the 
privacy justification for sex segregation. Citing cases involving prisoners, it 
noted that individuals “have a special sense of privacy in their own 
genitals.”189 While recognizing that the school district had modified the boys’ 
restrooms to alleviate this privacy concern, the district court found “no amount 
of improvements to the urinals can make them completely private because 
people sometimes turn while closing their pants.”190 The district court failed to 
explain why it is permissible to put boys in a situation where other boys might 
see their genitals but not permissible to put boys in a situation where a 
transgender boy (or even a girl) might see their genitals. The evocation of 
“privacy,” as articulated by the district court, has an implicit gendered 
assumption—that it is acceptable for restrooms to traditionally offer girls and 
women complete shielding from others seeing their “private parts” while not 
offering boys and men the same degree of privacy. If it is problematic for boys 
to have to expose their genitals to others in order to urinate, then one might 
argue that all boys have a privacy interest in the reconfiguration of their 
restrooms. Neither the district court nor the Fourth Circuit explained why girls 
but not boys should have an expectation of privacy when using the restroom.  
To understand the privacy argument in the sex-segregated restroom 
context, it is helpful to remember the original description of the changes that 
were predicted to result after ratification of the ERA. Proponents of the ERA 
contended that restrooms could still be sex segregated after the ERA was 
ratified because “under current mores, disrobing in front of the other sex is 
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usually associated with sexual relationships.”191 In other words, ERA 
proponents considered the desegregation of restrooms (along with women in 
the military and same-sex marriage) to be too controversial to pursue when the 
ERA was first proposed. This view was based on sexist and heteronormative 
assumptions, as revealed in the above quote which explicitly references 
“[hetero]sexual relationships.”192 While women should not possibly be 
exposed to male genitalia in a restroom, it is acceptable for men to be exposed 
to the genitalia of other men in a public restroom. Boys and men are expected 
to publicly display their penises while also following “masculine homophobic 
imperatives that exclude homosexual contact.”193 Men are expected to have a 
lesser sense of privacy than women; women cannot even use the legal system 
to acquire men’s lesser version of privacy.194 This gendered and 
heteronormative notion of privacy should be considered antiquated in light of 
the advancements in LGBT rights. Men and women, gay and straight people, 
should have equal claims to a right to privacy. The current configuration of 
bathrooms privileges heterosexual women’s privacy concerns while also 
promoting the stereotype that women are the weaker sex needing protection. 
Further evidence of the pretextual nature of the privacy argument is that 
public restrooms are typically sex segregated even when they contain only one 
stall. People enter these restrooms one at a time; they are not a shared space 
where men or women might see each other’s private body parts. One can only 
imagine that the reason for that commonplace practice is the social discomfort 
in a woman entering a space that was previously occupied by a man or vice 
versa. But those feelings have no basis in anything but sexual stereotyping; 
they cannot be based on a genuine interest in privacy because those single 
stalls are entirely private.  
2. Safety 
Safety concerns are also used to justify sex-segregated bathrooms and to 
limit those facilities to individuals who were born to a particular sex or had 
surgery to transition them to a particular sex. Thus, the Ninth Circuit accepted 
a safety argument in finding no Title VII liability for a community college that 
precluded a woman from using the female restroom until she had completed 
sex reassignment surgery.195 In Grimm, the school district also offered a safety 
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concern to justify keeping the transgender, male plaintiff out of the boys’ 
restroom.196 Like the privacy argument, this argument is also based on 
gendered and heteronormative assumptions. 
These kinds of safety concerns were previously recognized to keep women 
out of male, high-security prisons. In a famous sentence, Justice Stewart, 
writing for a majority of the Supreme Court in 1977, stated: “The employee’s 
very womanhood would thus directly undermine her capacity to provide the 
security that is the essence of a correctional counselor’s responsibility.”197 
Such concerns are no longer accepted to keep women out of jobs as guards in 
male prisons.198 
Sex segregation can create, rather than solve, safety concerns. For 
example, sex-based segregation sometimes causes parents to allow their young 
children to enter a restroom by themselves when they are really too young to 
do so safely. In 1998, an aunt was horrified to discover that a man murdered 
her nephew in the men’s room while the aunt dutifully waited outside for her 
nephew to use the facility by himself.199 People with disabilities who might 
benefit from assistance from an opposite-sex companion sometimes find 
themselves using a facility alone at some danger to their personal safety.200  
The genuine safety concern stems from the fact that women and girls are 
disproportionately victims of sexual violence by men.201 Men already sexually 
assault some girls and women by lying in wait for them outside women’s 
restrooms. Having men able to enter these restrooms freely, where girls and 
women may be present, could arguably increase their risk of sexual assault on 
the assumption that other men and women, if present in the restroom, would 
not be able to or willing to render any assistance.202  
This safety argument seems to presume, inappropriately, that men 
typically lay in wait outside the women’s restroom rather than enter to engage 
in a sexual assault. It is hard to understand how keeping all men outside of the 
restroom used by a woman makes the space safer when the man who is 
interested in committing an unlawful sexual assault is probably not especially 
concerned about the “women’s” sign on the front entrance. Sheila Jeffreys has 
documented the various ways that women are already harassed by men in 
women’s restrooms, including a practice called “upskirting,” which involves 
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“photographing up women’s skirts without their knowledge.”203 In support of 
her argument in favor of sex segregation, Jeffreys offers two anecdotes 
involving transgender women who had male genitalia and were able to use 
women’s changing facilities.204 One of them reportedly displayed an erection 
in front of a woman within the changing room.205 These anecdotes, however, 
reflect changing rooms where there was no privacy from exposure of genitalia. 
If privacy safeguards are in place in restrooms, none of the opponents of the 
elimination of sex segregation have been able to offer concrete evidence of an 
increased risk of harm to women or men from the elimination of sex 
segregation.206  
In considering the safety issue, it is also important to remember that sexual 
assault is not limited to men victimizing women. Men can sexually assault 
men; women can sexually assault women. Just as conventional notions of 
privacy offer more privacy to women than men, our desire to protect people 
from sexual assault when using the restroom may offer more protection to 
women than men. The aunt whose nephew was murdered in the men’s 
restroom might feel that her nephew would have been much safer in the 
women’s restroom, even if he had entered it alone. Mere assertions of safety 
without empirical evidence in support of those arguments cannot meet the 
required constitutional standard. It is possible that men might be less likely to 
assault women in a restroom if they thought another man might enter that 
space. Because of our historical practice of sex segregation, we have little 
basis to answer that question. 
Due to the longstanding and unwarranted concerns about women’s frailty, 
public entities should have to meet an objective legal standard before insisting 
on sex-segregated restrooms to further public safety. In the disability context, 
people have often been subject to similar stereotypes about safety issues, and 
the Department of Justice has created the following regulation to dictate how 
public entities can consider safety arguments in the disability context: 
In determining whether an individual poses a direct threat to the health or 
safety of others, a public entity must make an individualized assessment, 
based on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical knowledge or on 
the best available objective evidence, to ascertain: the nature, duration, and 
severity of the risk; the probability that the potential injury will actually 
occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or 
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procedures or the provision of auxiliary aids or services will mitigate the 
risk.207 
This regulation would not work perfectly in the sex-segregated restroom 
context but could be modified to provide a parallel set of safety rules. One 
could say, for example:  
In determining whether sex-integrated restrooms pose a direct threat to the 
health or safety of women or men, a public entity must make an assessment, 
based on reasonable judgment that relies on the best available objective 
evidence, to ascertain: the severity of the risk, the probability that the 
potential injury will occur, and whether reasonable modifications of restroom 
design will mitigate the risk.  
Such a rule would be a big improvement over sex segregating public 
restrooms out of a purported safety concern merely because it has always been 
done that way. With such a safety rule in place, government entities would 
have to have some empirical basis in support of sex segregation; they could 
not impose it simply because it has always been that way. 
Let me be clear: the safety of women and men, as well as boys and girls, 
while they use a public restroom is very important. Assuming that sex 
segregation solves the safety problem, without a close examination of the 
genuine ways in which sexual assault may occur in such spaces, advances 
sexual stereotypes while not necessarily advancing safety.  
IV. FLIP THE DEFAULT RULES 
At the present time, various federal and state policies mandate sex-
segregated restrooms for large communal facilities while also permitting 
various family-style or single-stall restrooms for those people who choose to 
use alternative facilities. The default policy is sex-segregated restrooms. The 
exception is restrooms open to people of any sex. 
My suggestion is quite simple—we should flip the default rule. Public, 
communal restrooms should not be limited by sex. Within these restrooms, 
entities can provide a range of toilet styles with appropriate privacy barriers 
between stalls, as well as disability accessibility.208 Currently, restrooms have 
several configurations to provide accessibility to people who use wheelchairs 
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or canes. It is possible to have more than one toilet configuration within a 
restroom. The default rule should therefore be sex-integrated toileting 
facilities. If entities choose to also provide a limited number of single-stall 
restrooms for people who might prefer not to use the large, communal 
restroom, then they can do so. Those single-stall restrooms should be available 
to a wide range of people and therefore include fully accessible toilets.209 
One argument against the creation of sex-integrated restrooms is that it is 
unrealistic. Institutions won’t build them, or people won’t use them. Writing in 
2007, Anthony and Dufresne documented that what they call “mixed-gender 
restrooms” do exist and are accepted at various locations.210 Ohio University, 
the University of New Hampshire, and other universities have been using such 
bathrooms for years.211 Ironically, the argument that “women won’t use them” 
was the argument at the beginning of the twentieth century to justify having 
few public restrooms available for women.212 Today, it is more common for 
women to complain about a lack of available restrooms or longer lines at 
women’s restrooms. So, we have flipped the default rule there; women have 
come to expect to find available restrooms in public spaces. 
I can still remember the “bathroom” vote when I was living at the coed 
Radcliffe dorms while a student at Harvard University in the 1970s. As a 
sophomore in 1975 living in campus housing, we were told by our resident 
advisor that each hall would have a bathroom vote. If everyone voted to make 
the bathrooms coed then we could use any bathroom on the floor. If not, then 
the bathrooms on the floor would be designated male or female. We voted 
unanimously to make our bathrooms coed and became accustomed to seeing 
men and women enter and exit the restroom to use the shower or toilet. But I 
also remember my father coming to visit. He asked me, “Where is the men’s 
room?” Unabashedly, I explained he could use any restroom. He responded, 
“I’ll wait until we get to the restaurant.” For me, the default rule had flipped so 
I was accustomed to using a coed restroom. For him, the default rule was 
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firmly in place so he experienced discomfort until he could find a restaurant 
with a sex-segregated restroom.  
It is time to flip the default rule by invalidating all the state and federal 
laws and policies that mandate sex-segregated restroom facilities. We’ll get 
used to it. 
